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Abstract: This paper considers the implications of increasing land supply constraints in the U.S. 
on urban demand.  First, because shifts in demand are now capitalized more into the price of 
land, house prices in some metropolitan areas have grown increasingly unaffordable to typical 
households.  This might have an effect on the fundamental character of such cities.  Second, the 
effect of home owners’ financial interests as landowners on their decisions of about what 
regulations or investments in their communities to support may become stronger.  Third, 
researchers may now be able to better use land prices to make inferences about urban demand.  
However, interpreting real estate prices is still tricky. 
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 Characterizing the intersection of real estate finance and economics and urban economics 
turns out to be a not particularly straightforward thing.  That perhaps should not come as a 
surprise, since neither field has a tidy definition, all wrapped up with crisp edges and neat 
corners, plus a bow for good measure.  Instead, urban economics is broadly concerned with the 
study of cities and real estate is broadly concerned with the study of commercial and residential 
property.  Since most of the world’s real estate value is in cities, it is natural that the fields 
overlap considerably and somewhat surprising that they are not more fully integrated. 
Indeed, those who study real estate and those who study urban economics are interested 
in many of the same phenomena.  For example: Patterns of agglomeration – with households 
choosing to live in close proximity to other households, or firms choosing to locate their 
operations near other firms – and how that agglomeration might evolve over time.  Urban growth 
– and where it might occur, and by how much.  Incomes – and how they differ across space. 
 However, those who have focused on real estate and those who have focused on urban 
economics often have come at these topics from disparate points of view.  To real estate 
practitioners real estate is an input to some broader goal.  To some, real estate is an investment, 
an asset that one acquires to in order to produce a financial return.  For their calculus, what 
matters is real estate’s income earning potential – its rent – and its current and future prices.  To 
others, real estate is a factor of production, akin to capital or labor, necessary for the operation of 
an enterprise.  They tend to focus on the cost of obtaining real estate.  By contrast, to urban 
economists, real estate is an output of a more general underlying process.  The same forces that 
lead to the formation of cities make particular locations valuable. 
These two viewpoints intersect via the market for land.  One can think of urban 
economics as being in part about what affects the demand for particular locations.  An 
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agglomeration economy, where a firm’s productivity is determined in part by its proximity to 
other firms, is one example of such a demand shifter.  Firms would have greater demand to 
locate near existing firms if there were positive spillovers to doing so.  City amenities, such as 
weather or art museums, are other examples.  When locations with such amenities are scarce, 
land commands rents.  On the real estate side, the financial market transforms current and 
expected future rents into asset prices for the locations. 
 Because of this interconnectedness between real estate and urban economics, it is 
interesting to think of the implications of urban economics for real estate and vice versa.  In this 
paper, I emphasize the role of land prices and ponder how rising prices could reinforce or deter 
the demand for certain locations that led to the price growth in the first place.  I begin by 
discussing a necessary condition for growth in the price of land: Inelastic supply.  Because 
supply constraints in the U.S. have increased, shifts in demand may be more capitalized into the 
price of land than in the past.  This has several interesting implications.  First, the price of real 
estate, relative to the national income distribution, has increased in some metropolitan areas over 
the very long run.  For example, houses in some metropolitan areas, especially those on the west 
coast of the U.S., have slowly grown unaffordable to all but the highest-income decile or so of 
the national income distribution.  I then discuss what this phenomenon might imply for the future 
of cities, given existing hypotheses about the determinants of urban growth.  Second, when 
residents own real estate in an area where land is inelastically supplied, their decisions about 
what regulations or investments in their communities to support may be affected by their 
financial interest in obtaining a higher value for their location.  Third, real estate prices may help 
researchers make inferences about urban demand.  However, using them is tricky.  Prices convey 
information, but the signal is somewhat noisy.  For one, the extent of price capitalization is 
  3
determined by the elasticity of supply of land, which has been changing over time and across 
cities in the U.S.   In addition, while real estate rents are determined by the supply and demand 
for space, we typically observe only real estate prices.  Changes in those prices result not only 
from supply and demand fundamentals, but from other factors that influence the asset market, 
such as interest rates and the expectations of future growth.  
 The rest of this paper proceeds as follows:  I first present how urban economics can be 
thought of as demand for a location and how the elasticity of land supply translates the demand 
into land prices.  The evolution of the land supply elasticity over time is described.  Next, I 
explore metropolitan area house prices between 1950 and 2000 and compare them to the national 
income distribution.  I outline some potential implications of rapidly-growing house prices.  In 
Section 3, I discuss why it might matter if households are real estate owners as well as users.  
Section 4 considers the role of asset market equilibrium in setting real estate prices and the 
difficulties in using them for inferences in empirical work.  Lastly, Section 5 concludes.  
 
1. USING REAL ESTATE RENTS AS A MEASURE OF URBAN DEMAND 
 A large portion of urban economics is concerned with the demand for urban location: 
Why is it that both firms and households locate in close proximity to other firms and households 
in cities?  There are a number of potential reasons and, in all likelihood, all have held to some 
degree or at some point in time.  Firms might wish to locate near other firms because of returns 
to agglomeration, whether through lower-cost transportation of goods and services between 
them, knowledge spillovers amongst them, or by having access to a thick pool of labor that 
accumulates around a large concentration of employers.  Households might wish to live near 
other households because they enjoy them, or because it takes a sufficiently large concentration 
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of residents to make it profitable for firms to provide locally the goods and services, and 
governments to provide public amenities, that the residents want.  Once those amenities are in 
place, the location would be more valuable to the marginal household.   
 One can search for evidence of these factors along a number of dimensions.  A large 
strand of the literature tests whether firms are more productive when they have agglomerated by 
looking at measures of output.  Another strand concentrates on the implication for workers: if 
cities are more productive, workers should receive higher wages.  Other research considers firm 
locations.  And yet another set of papers examine city growth: If there is a benefit to 
agglomeration, cities should expand in population and the number of firms, at least until the city 
becomes so large that it becomes too congested, unwieldy, and inefficient to administer.1 
 However, if there is a benefit to a particular location – for whatever reason – the value 
may be in part capitalized into the price of the land.  Demand for a type of location can manifest 
itself in two ways: in higher land rents and in greater supply.  How much of the benefit is 
incorporated into the land rent depends upon the elasticity of supply of land that is substitutable 
for that particular location.  (One unique location, of course, is perfectly inelastic, except to the 
degree that more uses can be put onto the same parcel by increasing the density.)  If land supply 
is very elastic, little of the benefit will be reflected in the land rent as long as property prices 
exceed the cost of construction.  Instead, if property values rise above construction costs, 
developers will simply add more ‘city’ to the existing stock until prices (and rents) fall to the 
level where it is no longer profitable to build.  By contrast, if land supply is very inelastic, the 
city cannot expand, developers cannot build, and the benefits of location are capitalized into land 
rents. 
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 That static process can be seen in a basic demand-supply framework, as in Figure 1, 
which plots demand and supply curves in rent-quantity space.  An inelastic supply curve for 
urban locations is depicted with the S’ supply curve whereas the S supply curve is more elastic.  
Where the demand curve for urban locations, D, intersects the supply curve is the clearing price, 
where all urban space is just filled.  That price, C, is the rent, or the periodic cost of using a 
particular space.  Suppose the demand curve for urban locations shifts out, to D’.  If land is 
inelastically supplied, an increase in demand is capitalized fully into price, as rents rise from C to 
A.  If land is more elastically supplied, the same increase in demand leads to a smaller increase in 
rents (from C to B).2   
 The degree of capitalization into land rents is important for empirical research in real 
estate or urban economics because it affects where and how much the symptoms of urban 
demand show up.  Many common measures of urban demand, such as population growth, are 
affected by the elasticity of land supply.  For example, consider an outward shift of the demand 
curve.  That demand shift will be manifested in city growth and, eventually, a larger city if 
supply is perfectly elastic.  As an empirical researcher, one could thus infer that demand for a 
city increased if the city grew.  However, the same demand shock would be reflected solely in 
rents, with no city growth at all, if supply is perfectly inelastic.  And, if the elasticity of supply is 
in between, some of the greater demand would appear in city growth and some in rent.   
 The flip side of this particular coin is that land rents themselves, if used carefully, could 
also provide information about the extent of urban demand.  Greater demand translates into 
higher rent, ceteris paribus.  And since rents are expressed in dollars, the increment in rent from 
higher demand, assuming supply is inelastic, can be interpreted as the value of whatever factors 
are inducing that higher demand. 
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 A large set of empirical papers have used land prices to assign values to some feature of 
the urban economy.  This capitalization strategy can be applied whenever the feature of value has 
a spatial component to its distribution.  Papers that follow a Rosen (1979) and Roback (1982) 
view of spatial equilibrium, which theorizes that agents must trade off wages, land rents, and 
local amenities when choosing between cities, such as Blomquist, Berger, and Hoehn (1988) or 
Gyourko and Tracy (1989, 1991), have long found that differences in amenity levels or public 
finance across jurisdictions are capitalized into land rents and wages.  Amenities, such as quality-
of-life or efficient government, are frequently tied to a geographical location or a political 
jurisdiction.  Thus people should be willing to pay a real estate premium or accept a lower wage 
to live in those jurisdictions.  For example, Black (1999) estimates the value of better schools by 
seeing how much higher house prices are when the houses are located in the catchment area of a 
school with better test scores.3  Researchers in environmental economics have long estimated the 
cost of some environmental negative – a toxic waste dump, perhaps – by measuring how much 
less land is worth when it is in closer proximity to it. (Gallagher and Greenstone, 2008)  
Productivity, too, can be capitalized into real estate values when location affects output.  
Greenstone and Moretti (2004) estimate the value of productivity spillovers by seeing how much 
land prices rise when a firm chooses to locate in a particular area.4  If that firm provides positive 
externalities, the premium others would be willing to pay to locate close to it should go up, 
leading to higher land values.  Van Nieuwerburg and Weil (2007) examine the relationship 
between local productivity shocks and the distribution of house prices. 
 While land rents can convey significant information about the demand for locations, 
interpreting that information can be difficult for at least two reasons.  First, true rent is often 
difficult to observe.  While the theoretical rent is a spot price, in practice rents that are paid are 
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often specified in a multi-year contract signed years earlier and which may not reflect current 
market conditions.  In addition, when it comes to housing, renter households tend to be quite 
different than owner households and thus one cannot easily extrapolate from rent paid by renters 
to the rent that would be paid by owners were they to pay rent.  (Smith and Smith, 2006)  
Instead, we are much more likely to observe the price paid by a purchaser of property.  (We will 
discuss the particular issues that arise when one observes prices rather than rents in empirical 
work in Section 4, below.)  
Second, most research that studies the effect of something on land rents or prices assumes 
that land supply in an area or jurisdiction is perfectly inelastically supplied.  Sometimes the 
assumption of a vertical supply curve is appropriate.  But much of the time, it is not.  
Complicating the matter, the supply elasticity varies not only across jurisdictions, but over time 
within jurisdictions, and even can differ depending on the initial land value. 
A series of recent papers have noted that an important component of why house prices 
vary across metropolitan areas have to do with differences in the elasticity of supply.  The 
reasons for these cross-sectional differences in supply elasticity are varied.  Saiz (2008) shows 
that the topography of an area is one factor.  When much of a metropolitan area’s footprint is 
steeply sloped or under water, it is more expensive to build new structures, leading to a lower 
elasticity of supply.  Gyourko and Saiz (2006) point out that construction costs, too, vary 
considerably across metropolitan areas.  While geographic constraints on construction do not 
change over time, how binding they are may vary considerably.  As cities grow, eventually they 
may exhaust their easily-developable land.  For example, the remaining land might be costly to 
develop or less desirable leading to a less elastic supply of land.  Or, land use regulation – limits 
on new construction imposed by cities and towns – may have become more stringent, as argued 
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by Glaeser, Gyourko, and Saks (henceforth GGS) (2005a), Quigley and Raphael (2005), and 
Glaeser and Ward (2006).  For an example of one such piece of evidence, GGS (2005b) 
estimates that the marginal value of building an additional floor on a high-rise building in 
Manhattan is much higher than the marginal cost of constructing the additional floor.  The gap, 
they conclude, must be due to regulatory barriers or non-construction costs, such as lawsuits 
from opposed parties. 
Circumstantial evidence of this kind of pattern is developed in Gyourko, Mayer, and 
Sinai (2006), henceforth GMS.  A number of metropolitan areas in the U.S. appear to have 
become more supply constrained between 1950 and 2000, in that the rate of new home 
construction in those areas greatly diminished and concurrently the rate of house price growth 
rose.  The authors take that to be evidence of a rotation of the supply curve in those metropolitan 
areas from more-horizontal to more-vertical.   
Evidence of that same pattern can be seen in Table 1, which reports statistics on the 
inferred elasticity of supply, measured as the slope of the supply curve, across MSAs over a 
number of decades.  The “slope of the supply curve” is defined as the ratio of the average house 
price growth over the prior 20 years to the average housing unit growth, as in GMS (2006).  A 
separate slope is computed for each MSA in each year from 1970 to 2000.  A higher number 
corresponds to more inelastic supply since it implies that a change in demand is reflected more in 
price changes than quantity changes.   
The average slope (across equally-weighted MSAs) for each 20-year period is reported in 
the second column of Table 1.  Over time, the supply curve has become somewhat more steeply 
upward-sloping, on average, ranging from 0.77 over the 1950 – 1970 period to 0.99 over 1980 – 
2000.  This indicates that housing supply in the U.S. became more inelastic, or less price 
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responsive, over this period.  The third column reports the standard deviation (across MSAs) by 
year for the same supply statistic.  The MSAs had tightly clustered slopes of their supply curves 
between 1950 and 1980.  But by 1980 or so, the standard deviation increased considerably, 
almost tripling.  This pattern suggests that a small tail of MSAs experienced large decreases in 
supply elasticity (higher slope numbers), generating more dispersion. 
These changes in the elasticity of supply over time present a hurdle for empirical 
researchers working at the intersection of real estate and urban economics because it means that 
the extent to which urban demand is capitalized into land prices is not stable.  Even if a 
researcher collects data on both land prices and new construction, the changing ratio of price 
growth to a new supply response to an underlying change in demand makes the evidence 
difficult to interpret.   
A further complication arises from an important issue pointed out in Glaeser and 
Gyourko (2005): The elasticity of supply in a market depends on the relationship between real 
estate prices and construction costs.  The reason is that new supply is constructed only when real 
estate prices are in excess of their cost of construction, so developers can make a profit.  When 
prices are below construction costs – perhaps because of prior overbuilding that shifted the 
supply curve out, or because of a decline in demand relative to previous levels that shifted the 
demand curve in – supply is inelastic.  Because real estate is long-lived, if demand falls supply 
cannot contract in the short run, leading to full price capitalization of the drop in demand.  If 
demand rises, but not so much that prices exceed construction costs, it still is not worthwhile for 
new development to occur, and thus there again is full price capitalization.  Glaeser and Gyourko 
argue that, because of the kink in the supply curve induced by construction costs, real estate 
supply is much more inelastic when prices are not high enough to justify new construction than 
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when prices are above construction costs.  This argument is illustrated in Figure 2.  As in Figure 
1, the demand curve (D) is downward-sloping and we consider an outward shift to D’.  Unlike in 
Figure 1, the supply curve, S’’, is kinked rather than linear.  It is vertical up to a point and then 
slopes upwards.  The kink point is where prices exceed construction costs.  The points A and C 
are the same as in Figure 1: In the range where the supply curve is vertical, shifts in demand are 
fully capitalized into rent.  But an equal-sized demand shock, from D’ to D’’, that crosses the 
kink point is not fully capitalized into rent, since F-A is smaller than A-C.  Instead, some of the 
increase in demand is reflected in new construction, and thus higher Q, since construction is now 
profitable. 
Despite the ephemeral nature of the elasticity of supply, much empirical work has 
assumed it to be either perfectly inelastic or perfectly elastic.  The conclusions one draws about 
the underlying demand for a location are more tenuous when one recognizes that these extremes 
of supply elasticity or inelasticity are rarely reached.  The most accessible avenue of research 
would be to take into account cross-sectional differences across space in the elasticity of supply 
of land.  This could be done using the data in Saiz (2008) or Gyourko, Saiz, and Summers 
(2008).  By way of example, Glaeser, Gyourko, and Saiz (2008) assess whether the amplitude 
and duration of house price bubbles vary with cross-sectional differences in the elasticity of 
supply.  While it would be much more difficult to measure changes in the elasticity of supply 
within metropolitan areas over time, it would be a worthwhile research agenda.   
 
2. THE FEEDBACK BETWEEN ASSET PRICES AND URBAN DEMAND 
One of the potentially more interesting areas of intersection between urban economics 
and real estate is when real estate prices – which are driven by demand for a location – 
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themselves feed back and affect the characteristics that make an area desirable.  These are issues 
of the dynamic evolution of cities and raise the question of how urban areas will fare in the 
future. 
This phenomenon is especially salient now because only recently has land supply become 
fairly inelastic in some cities.  As described in GMS (2006) and GMS (2009), in the 1950s, every 
MSA in the U.S. had easily-developable land remaining.  By 1980, several MSAs became 
‘filled-up’ in the sense that it became difficult or significantly more expensive to develop further 
within an MSA, and new construction dried up relative to price growth in those MSAs.  That 
trend was exacerbated in 1990 and 2000. 
According to GMS (2006), at least one of the reasons for this dynamic was the 
considerable growth in population and incomes that the U.S. experienced over the 1950-2000 
time period combined with inherent tastes in the populace for some MSAs relative to others.  A 
growing income-weighted population meant aggregate demand was growing, too.  Some 
elastically-supplied MSAs could accept all potential residents; however, those with inelastic 
supply experienced price growth.  Initially, all MSAs were elastically supplied.  But as some 
cities started to reach physical or regulatory capacity, they shifted to more inelastic supply.  In 
GMS (2006), this is manifested as a shift in an MSA from experiencing high housing-unit 
growth and low price growth to experiencing low housing-unit growth and high price growth.   
It is instructive to look at the impact of this particular dynamic as it seems to have 
important implications for the future of over-demanded and under-supplied cities.  Table 2 
presents a measure of what fraction of U.S. households could reasonably afford to purchase 
houses in various MSAs, using as an affordability criteria that a household could pay three times 
its reported income.  Using decennial Census data, I constructed the national income distribution, 
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and then asked, for each MSA, at what percentile the median-valued home and 10th percentile-
valued home would map to the national income distribution in that year.5 
For example, the top panel of Table 2 reports the 10 MSAs that were the least expensive 
in 2000.  These MSAs include cities in states such as Texas and Oklahoma. In the leftmost panel, 
I report where the median value home in those 10 MSAs fall in the national income distribution 
for each decade from 1950 to 2000.  The percentiles range from 5 to 30, with most being around 
20 percent.  That means a median-valued house in each of these MSAs could have been 
purchased for three times annual income by anywhere from 70 to 95 percent of U.S. households 
in that year, which is an indication that these MSAs were inexpensive relative to the country as a 
whole.  The left panel of the top of Table 2 shows little change over time, as well. 
A similar pattern is repeated for the rightmost panel of the top of Table 2, which reports 
where the 10th percentile (by value) houses in the same 10 MSAs fall in the national income 
distribution.  Such houses in these cities were affordable by 85 to 95 percent of U.S. households 
from 1950 to 2000 and that degree of affordability changed little over this time period.  Clearly, 
for this set of MSAs, house prices did not rise relative to the national income distribution. 
The middle panel of Table 2 reports where the median (left panel) and 10th percentile 
(right panel) by value houses fall in the national income distribution for five MSAs at the middle 
of the house price distribution.  Median houses in these MSAs were affordable to 60 to 80 
percent of the national income distribution and a 10th percentile house could be afforded by 80 to 
95 percent of households nationally, with little change over the 50-year sample period. 
A quite different pattern can be found in the bottom panel of Table 2.  The MSAs in this 
panel are the 15 most expensive out of the 316 in the data.  These MSAs, which include much of 
coastal California, the New York area, Seattle, and Boulder, seem to have started out as fairly 
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typically priced.  In the left panel, the median houses in these cities in 1950 were affordable by 
around half of U.S. families.  (The actual points in the distribution range from the 25th to 65th 
percentiles.)  That degree of affordability persisted through the 1970s.  But starting around 1980, 
median house prices in these cities rose to higher points in the national income distribution, 
ranging from the 60th to the 90th percentile.  By 2000, no more than 25 percent of the U.S. 
population could buy the median house for three times income in these MSAs and in Santa Cruz, 
San Francisco, and San Jose, just 5 percent of the U.S. population could. 
The pattern repeats itself for the 10th percentile homes in these MSAs.  Between 1950 and 
1970, the 10th percentile homes could be purchased by the 10th to 30th percentile household in the 
U.S.  But starting in 1980, the range increased to the 25th to 60th percentile of households and, by 
2000, the 10th percentile home in these MSAs could be purchased by just 15 to 55 percent of 
U.S. households.  This change in affordability is matched by a change in the resident population: 
GMS (2006) finds that cities such as these experience decreases in their number of low- and 
middle-income residents and increases in their number of high-income residents.6 
The reason that this pattern is especially interesting is grounded in why it is that some 
cities are more desirable to certain segments of the population in the first place.  GMS (2006) is 
agnostic about those reasons, but what if they are influenced by the level of prices?   Does the 
desirability persist when (say) only 5 percent of the U.S. population can afford the median house 
and only 15 percent of the U.S. population can afford the 10th percentile house, as was the case in 
San Francisco? 
It is not a priori clear whether the screening on income or wealth that high house prices 
imply is a good thing or a bad thing for cities.  Perhaps if high-income households prefer to be 
around other high-income households, the market price mechanism reinforces the agglomeration 
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benefits.  By pricing those who would not contribute to or benefit from the high-income 
agglomeration out of a city, a high clearing price could prevent dilution of the concentration of 
high income households.  But what if the vibrancy of the city depends in part on heterogeneity in 
the population, such as in Jacobs (1969), especially heterogeneity that is correlated with 
differences in income?  What if artists, or young chefs, or even the middle class help make cities 
attractive?  One could imagine that an equilibrium might exist where prices merely would fall 
just enough to enable some of these beneficial households to live in the city, or perhaps such 
households would command higher wages in that city.  Alternatively, one could surmise that if 
households that make a positive contribution also prefer to agglomerate amongst themselves, 
displacing a cluster of such residents out of a city could persist for the long-term or permanently 
since it would be difficult for such an agglomeration to rebuild.  Or, a city could cycle between 
homogeneity and heterogeneity if moving is costly or slow to adjust.  Lastly, if the positive 
externalities created by households who contribute to heterogeneity – or the negative 
externalities from those who displace them – are not internalized, it is not clear what equilibrium 
might arise. 
For example, many explanations of urban growth and success depend on agglomeration 
externalities – positive spillovers between closely-located firms or households.  Those 
externalities can be productive, in that firms can produce output more efficiently if 
agglomerated, or consumption-based, in that households enjoy a location more if surrounded by 
positive externality-producing households.  In these cases, the value of a location is not 
necessarily inherent in the physical geography, but arises from who is there. 
Take, for example, the consumption benefits of living in cities. (Glaeser, Kolko, and Saiz, 
2001)  City amenities, such as restaurants, theaters, or the social scene, arguably make a city 
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more attractive to potential residents and thus more valuable.  But as Waldfogel has argued in a 
compelling series of papers (see, e.g., Waldfogel, 2003), what amenities are provided in a city, 
and at what level of quality, depends upon the composition of the residents.  When residents 
share similar tastes, amenities (or products) arise endogenously to serve the local market.  Given 
fixed costs of producing such amenities, goods, or services for the local market, there needs to be 
a sufficiently large audience to make production worthwhile.  In addition, the quality and variety 
of products provided increase in the size of the market.  In Waldfogel’s framework, each resident 
potentially provides a positive externality to other residents who share similar preferences.   
When a city enjoys elastic land supply, the return to the consumption agglomeration is 
not capitalized into land prices.  Instead, the residents enjoy more surplus or perhaps firms can 
pay lower wages.  But when a city is inelastically supplied, land prices will capitalize the returns 
to scale.  As long as all the residents produce and enjoy the consumption externalities 
symmetrically, presumably house prices will rise just enough that the marginal resident is 
indifferent between moving in and enjoying the consumption amenities, or not.   
But what if some residents benefit more from the consumption amenities and others 
produce them?  In that case the beneficiaries of the externalities would have a higher willingness 
to pay for an area than the producers.  When land is elastically supplied, this asymmetry does not 
matter since both types of households could purchase property at the cost of construction.  But 
when land is inelastically supplied, the existence of a consumption agglomeration could drive 
prices high enough that only beneficiaries of the agglomeration would be willing to pay the 
premium to move into the city and externality producers would not.  In the short run, this would 
not affect the existing agglomeration since the existing land owners would enjoy an increase in 
wealth – from the rise in prices – that would just enable them to remain in the city even if they 
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were producers of the externality.  (Ortalo-Magné and Rady, 2008)  But, over time, is the 
consumption agglomeration sustainable absent government intervention?7 
While low-income service providers, such as teachers, policemen, or gardeners, can 
command higher wages in a high-priced city, that occurs because their services are paid for by 
those who receive the benefits of them.  However, when some members of the population, by 
their mere presence, create a public good, it is difficult to generate appropriately higher wages 
for them.  Due to the free rider problem, beneficiaries of the public good are unlikely to 
voluntarily pay high enough wages to lead to the optimal provision of the public good.  Instead, 
government intervention may be necessary to subsidize the presence of public good providers.  
Some existing local public policies affect the composition of residents, presumably to manage 
externalities.  Exclusionary zoning, where potential entrants into a community are barred from 
purchasing small plots of land, impose a minimum wealth threshold for residence since land 
consumption is constrained to be high. (Inman and Rubinfeld, 1979)  On the other end of the 
spectrum, subsidized housing may be provided to enable low-income residents to live in a high-
priced area.  Another example is the practice of local governments giving incentives for firms to 
locate facilities in particular areas.  Of course, the difficulty with explicitly subsidizing perceived 
contributors to the public good is that the government would need to be able to identify such 
residents and place a value on their contributions. 
Not all MSAs have ended up so high-priced as to crowd out potential residents.  The top 
panel of Table 3 reports the mapping from the median and 10th percentile house values to the 
national income distribution for the 10 MSAs that experienced the largest gains in affordability.  
The list is comprised of declining cities: Cincinnati, Rochester, and Milwaukee are among the 
MSAs.  In 1950, the median houses in many of these MSAs were unaffordable to the median 
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household nationally, with the mapping into the percentile of the national income distribution 
reaching as much as the 65th percentile.  But the exclusivity steadily declined over the next 50 
years, so by 2000, their percentile in the national income distribution dropped by anywhere from 
30 to 15 percentage points.  (Less, if any, decline was seen for the 10th percentile homes in these 
MSAs.)  In another example of how the land prices can feed back into how an urban area 
develops, Glaeser and Gyourko (2005) have argued that declining cities such as these – ones 
with existing stocks of housing and thus inelastic supply – can become magnets for low-income, 
low ability families whose collective presence deters higher-income families from locating there 
since the higher-income families would face an excessive local tax burden.  Such high-income 
families can afford to live in other MSAs, while low-income families remain because house 
prices are below the cost of new construction in growing cities.8 
The bottom panel of Table 3 shows a completely different set of cities, those that 
experienced the greatest increase in where their house values mapped into the national income 
distribution.  Most of these MSAs span the west coast of the U.S. and experienced an increase in 
anywhere from 25 to 50 percentiles for their median valued houses and 15 to 60 percentiles for 
their 10th percentile valued houses. 
Despite the focus on the MSAs at the extremes, most metropolitan areas did not 
experience much, if any, change in their affordability over the 1950 to 2000 time period.  The 
middle panel of Table 3, which reports the mapping from the median and 10th percentile house 
values to the national income distribution for five MSAs around the median change in 
affordability, reflects this.  Growth in the median and 10th percentile house prices in these 
median MSAs tracked growth in the median and 10th percentile incomes at the national level 
over the entire 1950 to 2000 sample period.   
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3. BEING AN OWNER AS WELL AS A RESIDENT 
Another feedback mechanism between real estate and urban economics that has grown in 
importance as more areas have become inelastically supplied is that the political decision-makers 
are typically also property owners.  When land supply was elastic, decisions about what 
amenities to provide or land use regulations to impose would not affect residents’ wealth because 
property values would be unchanged.  But when such decisions are capitalized into land values, 
as is the case when land supply is inelastic, property owners have a financial interest in the 
outcome even if they would not directly benefit from it.  This point combines the gist of 
Fischel’s (2001) home-voter hypothesis with a distinction between inelastic and elastically 
supplied areas. 
For example, Hilber and Mayer (2009) show that in towns with inelastic land supply, 
families without children in schools are more likely to vote for increased school spending than 
similar families in towns where developable land is plentiful.  The ostensible reason is that 
higher school quality raises property values in towns where it is hard to add to the housing stock 
because the higher demand for living there leads to higher rental values.  Families in such a town 
not only get better schools when school spending increases, they get capital appreciation in their 
real estate.  In towns where it is easy to build more housing, better quality schools do not lead to 
higher property values.  Instead, they lead to more real estate development.  A family without 
children in such a town would be less likely to support higher school spending since none of the 
benefit of better schools would accrue to them through housing capital gains. 9 
The effect outlined in Hilber and Mayer arises because the households making the 
decision over what local amenity to provide are also the property owners.  When supply is 
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inelastic, their wealth depends on the desirability of their locality.  Because of this relationship 
between how vested in the outcome a household is and the elasticity of supply, it is natural that 
the very places where land prices capitalize a greater fraction of the value of an amenity, 
amenities are more likely to be provided and in greater value.     
The recent downturn in the housing market adds a complication to the relationship 
between home ownership and the provision of amenities.  When house prices have fallen enough 
that home owners owe more on their mortgages than their houses are worth, providing local 
amenities or public services that raise house prices creates wealth for the lender rather than the 
homeowner.  In that case, a home owner has less of an incentive to support the provision of such 
amenities.  (Ferreira, Gyourko, and Tracy, 2008)  This issue is especially salient when house 
price declines are pervasive throughout an entire jurisdiction because then the median voter may 
switch from a positive to negative equity position. 
These issues provide interesting food for thought: How might the evolution of urban 
areas be different as the set of stakeholders changes?  Does that evolution accelerate or slow 
down depending on whether home owners have positive equity in their homes? 
In addition, this relationship between property ownership and amenity provision leads to 
an empirical difficulty with using land prices to measure outcomes.  The very features of urban 
life that one wishes to value using land rent capitalization are themselves influenced by whether 
their creation leads to higher land prices.   
Another example: In most urban research, appealing (or unappealing) features of an area 
are assumed to be exogenous, or the outcome of some process that has little to do with the supply 
of land.  It is interesting to consider then what happens if this assumption is relaxed.  Perhaps 
cities with limited land are more likely to invest in parks and green space (thus further 
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exacerbating their supply inelasticity!) because the amenity raises their residents’ property values 
or because it would increase the tax base.  Perhaps a business improvement district, which is 
when a group of commercial property owners collectively agree to tax themselves and use the 
proceeds to provide a set of common services, would be most successful when supply is inelastic 
because commercial property owners would have a greater incentive to participate when their 
financial contributions to the B.I.D. would be offset by the subsequent increase in their property 
values.   
The fact that a homeowner’s wealth, through their own house values, moves in lockstep 
with housing prices has proven to be powerful in other contexts.  Ortalo-Magné and Rady (2008) 
use it to explain how households of divergent incomes can afford to live in the same (expensive) 
city: If the low-income households purchased their houses earlier, when housing was cheap, their 
wealth increased enough when their house prices rose to enable them to remain residents.  Thus 
old-timer low-income households coexist with newcomer high-income households.  Sinai and 
Souleles (2005) use it to explain why owning a house may reduce the risk of obtaining housing 
services.  Ortalo-Magné and Prat (2007) contend that, in part, a desire to maximize one’s own 
wealth leads homeowners to vote for regulations that limit new housing construction since the 
resulting inelastic supply could lead to higher house prices for them. 
 
4. THE ROLE OF ASSET MARKET EQUILIBRIUM 
 The difficulty with – and the interesting thing about – prices is that they capitalize more 
than just the current spot rent.  While rent represents the outcome of a spatial equilibrium, getting 
from rents to prices involves asset market equilibrium.  That is, an investment in real estate 
should yield an equivalent risk-adjusted return to an investment in some other asset.  Because of 
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this additional equilibrium, the price of real estate incorporates not only the underlying demand 
for that location, reflected in the current rent, but also the factors that determine the willingness 
of an owner to pay for a future stream of rental value.  Those factors include interest rates, how 
rents might change in the future, future prices, and uncertainty. 
An example of a simple pricing rule for real estate that satisfies asset price equilibrium is 
the price of a particular piece of real estate is equal to the expected present value of its rental 
value plus the expected present value of the sale price, less an adjustment for risk.  (Meese and 
Wallace, 1994; Sinai and Souleles, 2005)  For the sake of simplicity, this example leaves out 
complications such as any option value inherent in the investment or the possibility that prices 
could deviate from their fundamental values.  This zero-NPV equilibrium pricing rule can be 
written as: 
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where T is the holding period and it is the time-varying discount rate.  The first term in Equation 
(1) is the expected present value of the rental stream from the real estate.  The second term is the 
present value of the expected sale price, PT.  The last two terms in Equation (1) are present-value 
adjustments for the cost of the uncertainty surrounding future rents (πt) and the future sale price 
(ΠT), respectively. 
From Equation (1), one can see the difficulty in using real estate asset prices to proxy for 
rent.  Current prices depend not only on current rent, but on expectations about future rents and 
prices, the path of interest rates (the discount rate), and future risk premia.  If the same 
underlying factors that cause rent to change also cause those other variables to change, it 
becomes impossible to infer rental values solely from prices.  For example, one can imagine that 
an economic boom in a city that led to higher rents might also increase (or, arguably, decrease) 
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uncertainty, leading to a simultaneous change in the rental value and the risk premium.  Both 
changes would be reflected in the asset price.  Or, irrational expectations of future prices that 
deviate from the present value of the expected rental stream could induce differences between 
value measured using prices versus rents. 
If we assume all buyers and sellers of properties use the same pricing model, and rule out 
deviations in price from fundamental value, Equation (1) reduces to: 

















rEP       
because the price at any time t is just equal to the present value of the future rents less a risk 
adjustment.  Even with those assumptions, the asset price of real estate depends on the 
expectations of future rents as well as the current rent.  If a shift in the demand curve led solely 
to a proportional change in the current and all future rents, price would be a fine proxy for the 
theoretically-appropriate rental value.  But if the expected growth rate in rent changed along with 
the current rent, the capitalization into price would be magnified.  Whether or not that induces 
mismeasurement depends on what the econometrician is trying to capture.  And if the rent 
change is temporary, the measured percent change in price will depend on the proportion of the 
price that is due to current rental value versus the future value.  In high expected rent growth 
cities, that portion is smaller than in low expected rent growth cities.  (Himmelberg, Mayer, and 
Sinai, 2005) 
Equation (2) can be simplified further by assuming time invariant discount rates, i, 
unchanging risk premia, π, and a constant growth rate of rent, g.  In that case, Equation (2) 
reduces to the familiar static Gordon Growth Model:  girP  .  These are strong 
assumptions that we have little empirical evidence on.  Campbell et al. (2006) and Glaeser and 
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Gyourko (2006) have produced some relevant details in the housing context, with the former 
showing that risk premia are not constant over time in national time series data and the latter 
showing that the rent and interest rate processes are mean-reverting. 
Even the simple static Gordon Growth Model has important implications for researchers 
on the boundary of urban and real estate economics.  For one, it emphasizes that changes in the 
growth rate of rents, g, may be even more important for real estate prices than changes in the 
level of rents, r.  Since g can differ across cities, the relationship between price and rent –  
 kkk girP  1  -- will also vary across cities, k, as shown empirically for housing markets in 
Sinai and Souleles (2005) and GMS (2006).  Second, if one assumes that g (and even π, from 
earlier) varies across cities in a way that is unobservable to the researcher but do not change over 
time, it follows that inferences about differences in rental value can be obtained from prices only 
by looking at within-market changes in log price and discarding the cross-sectional across-city 
variation (or imposing some theoretical structure on the relationship).  This same point would 
hold for any unobservable factor that affected the gap between prices and rents differentially 
across cities.  For example, in most available data we do not actually observe the unit price or 
rent of real estate.  Rather, we observe the price per unit times the quantity purchased, as in a 
house price or monthly rent paid.  Since the sample of properties over which prices are observed 
might be quite different than the sample of properties over which rent is observed, and those 
samples can vary across cities, the comparability of prices to rents might differ across cities.  For 
these reasons, most researchers restrict their attention to within-city changes in prices, rents, or 
the ratio, though others try to make the measures more comparable (Smith and Smith, 2006).  
Overall, the Gordon Growth relationship needs to be true on average if researchers wish 
to proxy for within-city changes in rent using changes in real estate prices without including 
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additional controls.  In particular, it implies that the growth rate of prices should track the growth 
rate of rents since )ln()ln()ln()ln( 11   tttt rrPP  in each metropolitan area if g is constant 
within MSA.  To check this, in Figure 3 I have plotted the annual average growth rate in real 
house/apartment rents and real house prices for 316 Metropolitan Statistical Areas (MSAs) over 
the 1950-2000 period.  The data comes from the decennial U.S. Census, which reports the 
distributions of rents paid by renters and self-reported house values for owners at the county 
level in a number of discrete bins.  (The number and boundaries of the bins varies across 
Censuses.)  I aggregated the county level data in each Census year to the MSA level and, 
assigning the midpoint value of each rent or price bin to any household in that bin, computed the 
population-weighted average rent and price by MSA and Census year.  After deflating by the 
CPI, I calculated the geometric growth rate over the 1950-2000 period. 
Figure 3 shows that long-run growth rates in rent and prices are quite correlated and track 
each other nearly one-for-one, with rent growth and price growth tightly clustered around a 
straight line.  The coefficient on the bivariate regression line, which is the thick line in Figure 3, 
is 1.06 (with a standard error of 0.05), approximately parallel to the 45-degree line (the thin line).  
This implies that a one-percentage point higher long-run rent growth in an MSA corresponds to 
an approximately one-percentage point higher long-run price growth on average.  Overall, the 
correlation between the two growth rates is 0.75 and the R-squared of the bivariate regression is 
0.56. 
Although the slope of the regression line parallels the 45-degree line, the intercept of the 
regression line is higher.  For the low-rent growth portion of the sample, long run price growth 
ends up being about double rent growth. 
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This relationship between price and rent growth holds less well over shorter horizons, 
reflecting that there might be temporary deviations from the average in the other parameters in 
Equation (1).  Figure 4 plots the 20-year average growth rates in real rents and prices for each of 
the 316 MSAs, treating as independent the 1950-1970, 1960-1980, 1970-1990, and 1980-2000 
periods.  The correlation between the 20-year growth rates in rents and prices is 0.52 and the R-
squared of the bivariate regression is just 0.27.  This result is consistent with the finding in Gallin 
(2004) that the relationship between rents and prices varies over time but is mean-reverting.  
Despite the greater noise, on average 20-year price changes are again about the same as 20-year 
rent changes.  Although the estimated coefficient of 0.65 (0.03) is attenuated from the 1.0 of the 
45-degree line, within the range of most of the sample the attenuation is offset by a higher 
intercept on the regression line.  This pattern can be seen in Figure 4 by comparing the thick 
(regression) line and the thin (45-degree) line.   
 
5. CONCLUSION 
Since 1950, the U.S. has experienced increasing inelasticity of land supply in a subset of 
its metropolitan areas.  The resulting greater capitalization of demand into land rents and prices 
emphasizes the importance of the overlap between real estate and urban economics.  Namely, 
how does demand for urban areas affect real estate prices, and what can we learn from them?  
And, how do rising real estate prices affect the evolution of urban areas? 
This paper described a few stylized empirical facts and outlined some of the potential 
causes and implications.  One fact was that house prices in some metropolitan areas have grown 
increasingly expensive, relative to the national income distribution, over the last 50 years.  In 
some California cities, by 2000 the median valued house was affordable by just 5 percent of the 
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national population and the 10th percentile house by just 15 percent.  By contrast, in a number of 
other metropolitan areas, house prices became either no less unaffordable or, in the case of some 
declining cities, more affordable to the bulk of the U.S. population.  Another fact was that, on 
average, house price growth was a reasonable proxy for the growth in rental value.  Not only was 
this a useful confirmation of a key prediction of the asset market equilibrium concept, but it 
suggested that, at least in a long-run setting, prices reasonably substitute for rents in empirical 
work. 
Interesting questions and challenges remain well beyond those discussed in this paper.  
Fortunately for empirical researchers, the quantity and quality of data on real estate has improved 
tremendously.  House price indices are available for most metropolitan areas since 1980.  
Transactions data for individual houses, from sources such as DataQuick, are becoming more 
common.  Other providers have collected decades of data on rents for commercial real estate.  
Advances in geographic information systems, discussed elsewhere in this volume, enable 
matching of local characteristics to real estate data. 
                                                 
1 This literature is too voluminous to properly reference in this article.  See Rosenthal and 
Strange (2004), Moretti (2004) and Strange (2005) for overviews, as well as the papers by 
Bacolod et al, Glaeser and Resseger, and Puga in this volume. 
2 In the short-run, the supply curve might be nearly vertical (line S’) as city boundaries are pretty 
much set and development of new housing or commercial space in existing cities is a slow 
process.  Beyond the short-run, if the price of urban space is high enough, the market may create 
more urban locations, leading the supply curve to be flatter than vertical (line S).  One can 
imagine that existing cities could either expand their boundaries or increase their density (by 
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building more space within the same boundaries).  Or, new cities that substitute for existing 
cities could arise, increasing the aggregate supply of urban locations. 
3 For other capitalization studies, see: Oates (1969); Bayer et al (2007); and Cellini et al (2009), 
which concludes that investments in school facilities have a positive value net of fiscal cost since 
constructing them yield increases in house values. 
4 While most theories focus on land rents and prices, most empirical work considers properties, 
i.e. bundles of land and structures.  Land isolates the value of location since how much to spend 
on the structure atop the land is an independent choice.  However, unimproved land is rarely 
traded and what is, is not a representative sample.  Thus, most empirical researchers use property 
rents and prices.  See Davis and Heathcote (2007) for an aggregate decomposition of properties 
into structures and land rents. 
5 Although much of the discussion in this paper centers around housing markets, I would be 
remiss not to highlight that urban economics and commercial real estate overlap as well.  
Companies use land just like residents do. 
6 One should not take the exact numbers in this exercise too literally.  First, rather than 
comparing the price of a constant unit of land across MSAs, Table 2 compares the value of a 
house across MSAs.  House value reflects land and structure, and quantity as well as price.  The 
size and quality of the housing structure, or the quantity of land, reflected in the median and 10th 
percentile values might vary across MSAs.  Second, the Census reports house values and 
incomes in bins, so the percentiles are measured with noise. 
7 One could draw analogies to various strands of the Tiebout literature – see Scotchmer (2002) 
for a summary of club models in particular.  It seems likely that at best the agglomeration would 
be inefficiently sized and at worst equilibrium may not exist.   
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8 Alternatively, urban living may lead to greater development of cognitive skills.  (Bacolod et al 
(2010)) 
9 This point is related to the literature on Tiebout sorting with public goods and voting.  See 
Epple and Nechyba (2004) for a synopsis. 
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Table 1: Changing land supply elasticities across MSAs, 1950-2000 
 
Year 
Average slope of the 
supply curve 
Standard deviation of 
the slope of  
the supply curve 
1950 – 1970 0.77 0.58 
1960 – 1980 0.85 0.46 
1970 – 1990 0.87 1.23 
1980 – 2000 0.99 1.79 
 
Notes: Data is from the U.S. Decennial Census, 1950 – 2000.  The “slope of the supply curve” is 
defined as the ratio of the average house price growth over the prior 20 years to the 
average housing unit growth, as in Gyourko, Mayer, and Sinai (2006).  A separate slope 
is computed for each MSA in each year from 1970 to 2000.  A higher number 
corresponds to more inelastic supply since it implies that a change in demand is reflected 
more in price changes than quantity changes.  
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Table 2: Trends in the affordability of typical homes, by MSA 
 
MSA 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000
10 least expensive MSAs…
1 Brownsville 15 10 10 15 15 20 10 5 5 5 5 10
2 Enid 25 20 20 30 15 20 15 5 5 10 5 10
3 Joplin 15 10 15 25 15 20 10 5 5 5 5 10
4 McAllen 15 5 10 15 15 20 10 5 5 5 5 10
5 Abilene 25 20 20 25 20 20 15 5 5 10 5 10
6 Beaumont 25 20 20 25 20 20 15 5 10 10 5 10
7 Johnstown 25 20 15 25 20 20 10 5 5 10 5 10
8 Pine Bluff 15 20 20 25 20 20 10 5 5 5 5 10
9 Shermon-Denison 20 10 20 25 20 20 10 5 5 5 5 10
10 Steubenville-Weirton 25 30 25 30 20 20 15 5 10 10 5 10
5 median MSAs…
Akron 45 40 30 30 30 35 20 20 15 15 10 20
Asheville 25 20 25 30 30 35 10 5 10 10 10 20
Athens 20 30 25 30 30 35 10 5 10 10 10 20
Auburn-Opelika 20 20 25 30 30 35 10 5 10 10 10 20
Bloomington 25 30 25 30 30 35 15 5 15 15 10 20
15 most expensive MSAs…
1 San Jose 65 40 55 90 95 95 25 30 30 60 80 85
2 San Francisco 65 50 55 90 100 95 25 30 30 60 80 85
3 Santa Cruz 45 30 40 80 95 95 20 10 20 60 65 65
4 Orange County 45 40 55 90 95 85 20 30 30 60 80 50
5 Santa Rosa 45 40 40 80 90 85 20 10 20 60 55 50
6 Ventura 45 40 40 80 90 75 15 20 25 60 80 50
7 Salinas 45 40 40 80 80 85 20 10 25 60 55 45
8 Oakland 65 40 40 80 90 85 25 20 25 30 55 45
9 Bergen-Passic 65 50 55 60 90 75 25 40 30 30 65 45
10 San Luis Obispo 25 30 30 60 90 75 15 10 15 30 55 45
11 San Diego 45 40 40 80 80 75 25 30 25 60 55 45
12 New York 65 N/A 55 60 90 75 25 N/A 30 25 55 45
13 Nassau-Suffolk County 65 40 55 60 80 75 25 30 25 25 55 45
14 Seattle 45 40 40 60 65 75 20 20 25 30 30 45
15 Boulder 25 40 40 60 55 75 15 10 20 60 30 45
…Median-value home in the MSA …10th percentile-value home in the MSA
The percentile of the national income distribution where family income is above one-third of the…
 
 
Notes: Data is from the U.S. Decennial Censuses, 1950-2000.  Median and 10th percentile house values at the MSA level are compared to the income distribution 
at the national level.  The number reported in a cell is the percentile of the national income distribution in a given year that is mapped to by the median 
(or 10th percentile) house value in the corresponding MSA in the given year.  The rule for mapping is that the income percentile is where the national 
income is one-third of the MSA’s house value.  The “N/A” for New York occurs because of data limitations in the Census in 1960. 
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Table 3: Trends in the affordability of typical homes, for MSAs with the largest changes over time 
 
MSA 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000
10 MSAs with the largest decline…
1 Cleveland 65 40 40 60 30 35 25 20 25 25 15 20
2 Cincinnati 65 40 30 30 30 35 20 10 15 15 15 20
3 Rochester 65 40 40 60 30 35 20 20 20 25 20 25
4 Elmira 45 30 25 25 25 20 20 10 15 10 10 10
5 El Paso 45 30 25 30 25 20 15 10 15 10 10 15
6 Binghamton 45 40 30 30 45 25 20 10 15 15 20 15
7 Waterloo-Cedar Falls 45 30 25 30 20 25 15 10 15 15 10 10
8 Utica-Rome 45 30 25 25 30 25 15 10 15 10 10 15
9 Milwaukee 65 40 40 60 45 45 25 30 25 25 20 20
10 Madison 65 40 40 60 45 45 20 20 20 30 25 30
5 MSAs with the median growth…
Corvallis 45 40 30 60 30 50 15 10 15 30 20 35
Eau Claire 25 20 25 30 25 30 15 5 10 15 10 20
Evansville 25 20 20 30 25 30 15 5 10 10 10 15
Fayetteville 25 20 20 30 25 30 10 5 10 10 10 20
Florence 25 20 25 30 25 30 10 5 10 10 10 15
15 MSAs with the largest rise…
1 Santa Cruz 45 30 40 80 95 95 20 10 20 60 65 65
2 San Luis Obispo 25 30 30 60 90 75 15 10 15 30 55 45
3 Boulder 25 40 40 60 55 75 15 10 20 60 30 45
4 Santa Rosa 45 40 40 80 90 85 20 10 20 60 55 50
5 Salinas 45 40 40 80 80 85 20 10 25 60 55 45
6 Orange County 45 40 55 90 95 85 20 30 30 60 80 50
7 Santa Fe 25 30 25 60 55 65 10 5 15 25 30 35
8 San Jose 65 40 55 90 95 95 25 30 30 60 80 85
9 San Francisco 65 50 55 90 100 95 25 30 30 60 80 85
10 Ventura 45 40 40 80 90 75 15 20 25 60 80 50
11 Seattle 45 40 40 60 65 75 20 20 25 30 30 45
12 San Diego 45 40 40 80 80 75 25 30 25 60 55 45
13 Wilmington 20 10 25 30 30 45 10 5 5 10 10 25
14 Bellingham 25 20 25 60 45 50 15 5 15 25 25 30
15 Portland 25 30 25 60 30 50 15 10 15 25 20 35
…Median-value home in the MSA …10th percentile-value home in the MSA
The percentile of the national income distribution where family income is above one-third of the…
 
 
Notes: Data is from the U.S. Decennial Censuses, 1950-2000.  Median and 10th percentile house values at the MSA level are compared to the income distribution 
at the national level.  The number reported in a cell is the percentile of the national income distribution in a given year that is mapped to by the median 
(or 10th percentile) house value in the corresponding MSA in the given year.  The rule for mapping is that the income percentile is where the national 
income is one-third of the MSA’s house value. 
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.005 .01 .015 .02 .025 .03
Annual average real rent growth, 1950-2000
Predicted values 45-degree line
 
 
Notes: Data is from the U.S. Decennial Censuses, 1950-2000.  Each dot corresponds to an MSA 
average growth rate over the 1950-2000 period.
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-.02 0 .02 .04 .06
Annual average real rent growth, 20 year window
Predicted values 45-degree line
 
 
Notes: Data is from the U.S. Decennial Censuses, 1950-2000.  Each dot corresponds to an MSA 
average growth rate during a 20-year period between 1950 and 2000, so there are four dots per 
MSA. 
